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Abstract Using an appropriation game setting, we examine individual responses to
changes in a groups’ vulnerability to a probabilistic loss (L) of a public good. The
probabilistic loss parameter entails losing 10, 50 or 90% of the value of the public
good that is maintained through cooperation, where the likelihood of the loss
decreases in total group cooperation. By design, the expected marginal net benefits
to an individual and the expected harm to others depends endogenously on the
individuals’ expectations of group cooperation and exogenously on the magnitude
of the loss parameter. We find that individual cooperation is greater when forecasts
of total group cooperation are greater and where the magnitude of the probabilistic
loss is larger. There is, however, an interesting asymmetry in responses by two
subgroups. Subjects who are pessimistic regarding total group cooperation decrease
cooperation the higher the magnitude of the probabilistic loss and their decisions are
tied systematically to changes in their expectations of other’s cooperation. On the
other hand, subjects who are optimistic regarding total group cooperation are found
to be more cooperative, but their decisions are not systematically tied to changes in
expectations of others’ cooperation.
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1 Introduction
A growing number of experimental studies focus on issues related to probabilistic
losses associated with the provision or maintenance of public goods. Motivated by
issues of climate change, several previous studies have examined the behavioral
response to variations in exogenous probabilities of group losses (Milinski et al.
2008, 2011; Barrett and Dannenberg 2012). Other contributions, more relevant to
this study, examine endogenous probabilistic losses. In particular, Dickinson (1998)
and Gangadharan and Nemes (2009) examine provision-point public goods settings
where the probability of provision of a public good increases in contributions. In
addition, Walker and Gardner (1992) and Blanco et al. (2016b) explore the
relevance of endogenous probabilistic losses in appropriation game settings.
An important example of the relevance of endogenous probabilistic losses in
appropriation settings relates to the provision or maintenance of ecosystem services,
which have the characteristics of public goods in that they yield positive
externalities to a population. In this context, probabilistic loss externalities are
relevant in a wide collection of settings (see TEEB 2010) where increasing pressure
by resource users results in an increased likelihood that a major ecosystem
disturbance occurs and compromises the capacity of the ecosystem to generate
ecosystem services or even to survive. The vulnerability of ecosystems to
appropriation pressures is dependent upon a number of factors, including the
geographical location, the ecosystem network, and the level of biodiversity. Similar
issues of vulnerability and probabilistic losses apply to the provision of public
goods, for example mitigation investments to dampen the effects of climate change.
In the context of an appropriation setting, this experimental study examines how
subjects respond to changes in the magnitude of an endogenous probabilistic loss of
a public good, where the probability of occurrence of the loss decreases with greater
cooperation. Specifically, we examine loss parameters that entail losing 10, 50 or
90% of the value of the public good maintained through cooperation. The study
makes several important contributions to the social dilemma literature. First, while
previous experimental research has compared the response of subjects to
endogenous probabilities of public good provision to settings with exogenous
probabilities (Dickinson 1998; Gangadharan and Nemes 2009) and to settings
without a probabilistic component (Gangadharan and Nemes 2009; Blanco et al.
2016b), the experiments reported here are the first to address the response of
subjects to manipulations in the magnitude of the endogenous probabilistic
component. Thus, we provide the first results on the quantitative response to the
magnitude of endogenous losses rather than just to the existence of the endogenous
component.
Secondly, to our knowledge, no previous social dilemma study has identified the
asymmetry in behavior we observe between subjects who are optimistic about group
performance and those who are pessimistic. On average, we show that own
cooperation increases with forecasts of total group cooperation (and the
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corresponding marginal incentives to cooperate), and the treatment effects show that
the quantitative response is greater the larger the magnitude of the loss parameter.
Moreover, our results provide a novel insight by discovering significant differences
in the response to variations in the loss parameter depending on whether subjects are
pessimistic or optimistic about group behavior. Pessimistic subjects reduce
cooperation the higher the magnitude of the loss parameter and their decisions
are tied systematically to changes in the marginal incentives that correspond to their
expectations of others’ appropriation. Optimistic subjects are more cooperative, but
their decisions are not systematically tied to changes in marginal incentives that
correspond to changes in expectations of others’ appropriation.
These novel results add to the emergent experimental literature that explores
individual differences in the responses to marginal incentives and reciprocity (see
for example, Brandts and Schram 2001; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Goeree et al. 2002;
Brandts et al. 2004; Blanco et al. 2016a, b). These studies, like ours, address
decisions in a menu game setting where subjects report cooperation levels for
variations in marginal incentives or others’ cooperation. This attribute of the design
allows us to examine within subject decisions in regard to how they respond to
changes in game parameters. Moreover, like most of these studies (Fischbacher
et al. 2001; Goeree et al. 2002; Blanco et al. 2016a, b), we report one-shot decisions.
This allows us to abstract from group dynamics related to strategic play across
decision rounds, and thus avoid the complexity of modeling subject’s responses to
the dynamics of a repeated game. This type of setting is reminiscent of individual
decisions in large group settings where there is limited or no knowledge of decisions
by others and where group dynamics play little role in decision making.
In the games examined, we use a ‘‘take some’’ frame1 where appropriation leads
to (1) deterministic losses, by reducing the value of a shared group resource, and to
(2) endogenous probabilistic losses, where greater appropriation increases the
probability that the shared resource faces an additional loss in value.2
Given the existence of an endogenous probabilistic loss, the expected value of the
shared resource to an individual and the expected harm to others from appropriation
is endogenously defined by the first order beliefs of others’ appropriation and
exogenously defined through parameter variations in the magnitude of the
probabilistic loss. By eliciting subjects’ expectations of other’s behavior, the
experimental design allows for estimation of the relationship between changes in
1 Earlier studies addressing decision environments in which subjects’ decisions are framed as providing a
public good or preventing a public bad include by Andreoni (1995), Sonnemans et al. (1998),
Dufwenberg et al. (2011), Cox et al. (2013), Hoyer et al. (2014) and Khadjavi and Lange (2015). Unlike
these studies, this study is not designed to investigate the effect of alternative frames of the social
dilemma.
2 The game studied here captures the essence of probabilistic degradation externalities, while abstracting
away from production externalities normally associated with appropriation in common-pool resource
settings. Extensive field and experimental research has focused on production externalities (e.g., Agrawal
2001; Baland and Platteau 1996; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1992, 1994; Wade 1988). Production
externalities are generally viewed as situations where appropriation increases the cost per unit of
appropriation or increases the effort required per unit appropriated for all users. By focusing primarily on
production externalities, this literature has largely neglected the relevance of ecosystem services provided
by the natural resources from which appropriation occurs.
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expected marginal incentives and appropriation decisions. In addition, for control
purposes, the experimental design includes a ‘‘benchmark game’’ without the
possibility of a probabilistic loss and fixed marginal incentives to appropriate. Using
subjects’ decision in this game as a measure for ‘‘baseline cooperation’’, we are able
to examine individual responses to the addition of a probabilistic loss and to the
changes in the magnitude of that loss.3
The studies cited above that focus on endogenous probabilistic losses vary in
regard to how they approach the issue that expected marginal incentives change as
group behavior changes. More specifically, Walker and Gardner (1992) focus on
game continuation, and not on individual subject responses to expectations of
marginal incentives. Both Dickinson (1998) and Gangadharan and Nemes (2009)
focus on expected per capita return of contributions, based on one-period lagged
behavior, implicitly assuming that expectations of current round group contributions
are based on behavior in the previous round. Blanco et al. (2016b) introduces the
deterministic and probabilistic degradation games used in this study and investigate
the response to variations in subjects’ private benefits in settings without
probabilistic losses and in settings with a probabilistic loss of 50% of the shared
resource. This previous paper explicitly links expected value of marginal net
benefits to subjects’ forecast of other group members’ appropriation. In contrast to
the present study, that study does not examine the response to changes in the
magnitude of the probabilistic loss nor does it examine differences in individual
responses for optimistic and pessimistic subjects on group performance, as defined
herein.4
2 Decision settings and parameters
The experimental design included four one-shot decisions from a menu of games
(part A), an incentivized first-order belief-elicitation task related to each of the
games (part B), a risk aversion task (part C) and a dictator donation to charities (part
D). In part A, incentives in all games are measured in Experimental Currency Units
(ECUs). In these games, groups of n = 4 individuals face allocation decisions
between a ‘‘Group Fund’’ and an ‘‘Individual Fund.’’ Each four member group
begins with a Group Fund endowment of w = 100 tokens, where every token left in
the Group Fund has a value of g = 2 ECUs. Each individual begins the game with 0
tokens allocated to their Individual Fund. Individuals privately decide how many
tokens to move from the Group Fund which are then placed in their Individual Fund,
with a maximum appropriation limit of e = 25 tokens per individual. Each token an
3 In this way, the results reported herein complement the findings in Goeree et al. (2002). These authors
examine provision of a public good, where contributions create an ‘‘internal return’’ to the contributor that
can differ from the ‘‘external return’’ to other group members with deterministic parameters. A greater
internal return lowers the cost of contributing while a higher external return increases the benefit to other
group members.
4 The subject population for this study was students from the University of Innsbruck, Austria, whereas
the subject population for Blanco et al. (2016b) was from the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Colombia.
The results reported herein are based solely on the data from the University of Innsbruck.
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individual i moves from the Group Fund, in a given treatment condition j, yields a
private benefit increasing the value of his/her Individual Fund by h = 1 ECU. Each
token left in the Group Fund has a value of g/n = 0.5 ECUs for every member of
the group and thus appropriation generates a deterministic degradation to the group
of g. Concurrently, appropriation generates a probabilistic degradation, imple-
mented as a hazard rate that depends on the aggregate number of tokens
appropriated from the Group Fund. Subjects confront a fractional loss L of the total
value remaining in the Group Fund after all decisions are final. The endogenous




, where p = 0.01 the fractional
increase in the probability associated with each token appropriated from the Group
Fund. The feasible range of values of p 2 0; 1½  and L 2 0; 1½ .
Letting zij denote the amount individual i appropriates from the Group Fund in
treatment j, Eq. (1) presents the payoff to individual i in ECUs. The probabilistic
degradation externality is described in the last component of Eq. (1).








Lj  pZð Þ w Zð Þ
  ð1Þ
where Z ¼ Pni¼1 zij, and pZ 1. Ceteris paribus, the experimental design varies
L across games in Part A, with L = 0.10, 0.50 and 0.90, and p = 0.01 in all cases.5
We refer to these treatment conditions as L10, L50 and L90, and the benchmark
game, where L = 0 as L0. A total of 111 subjects participated in these sessions.6
The instructions for each game in Part A, as well as quizzes to check subjects’
understanding of the games, were presented sequentially (see the Electronic
Supplementary Material). As in Brandts and Schram (2001), it was the subjects’
choice to determine the order in which he/she made decisions in the games of part
A. Importantly, at any point during decision-making in part A, subjects had the
opportunity to review and change any of the choices they had already made. After
all participants had time to finalize their decisions, the experimenter announced the
end of part A, after which no one was allowed to change their decisions.
Part B was an incentivized belief elicitation task following Croson (2007), in
which subjects were asked to report a forecast of the average per-person
appropriation level for the other members of their group for each of the four
games in part A. Subjects learned of the details of part B only after completing part
A, with no feedback of results from part A. While making their forecasts, subjects
could refer to a copy of their own decision-making sheet from part A.
Part C was a risk elicitation task that was a modified version from Dohmen et al.
(2010), with the stake sizes used in Balafoutas et al. (2012). In this task subjects had
5 All values of L were presented to subjects as percentages.
6 The number of subjects is not divisible by four due to the fact that one participant left one of the
sessions before it was completed. The session continued with each participant making their decisions,
without feed-back. Because of the one-shot nature of the decision setting, the formation of groups was
only implemented in order to calculate payments, after all decisions were final. There was no group feed-
back or identification of groups during the session. For the group with three members, the average
appropriation of the three group members was used for the 4th member to compute payments. At no point
during the session did any of the participants raise a question or concern about this one subject leaving the
session.
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to choose between a certain payment or a lottery yielding 5 Euros or 0 Euros, each
with a 50% probability. Subjects made a total of 10 decisions, where the amount
they received in the certain payment increased from 0.5 to 5 Euros in 50 cent
intervals.
Part D was a dictator task with charities as recipients, where subjects had to
allocate 3 Euros between themselves and one (or several) of eight charities offered
to them. The decision sheet included a list of the charities as well as a short
description of their mission. In order to circumvent the issue that some subjects
might prefer to donate to one of the charities following the experiment, subjects
were informed that the experimenter would increase the amount a subject allocated
to the charities by 25%.
After finishing part D, subjects answered a short questionnaire. Payments were
based on one of the games in each of the parts A, B, and C, and the amount of
money subjects kept for themselves in part D. All drawings used for determining the
games for computing experiment earnings were made in public. Subjects were paid
in private in cash.7
3 Expected marginal incentives
Based on the payoff functions given in Eq. (1), the marginal net benefit (MNB
j
i ) of










Ljp  w 2Zð Þ ð2Þ
where pZ 1. Notice, with p = 0.01 in all games, the probabilistic nature of the
game implies that the magnitude of MNB
j
i depends on aggregate group appropria-
tion Z, and the parameter L. Thus, based on differences in first order beliefs of
others’ behavior, subjects facing the same parameter values will face different
marginal incentives to appropriate.8 Table 1 displays the specific functional relation
between MNB
j
i and aggregate group appropriation for each of the treatment con-
ditions j = L0, L10, L50 and L90. Figure 1 displays the value of MNB
j
i at each
possible level of group appropriation, as well as illustrating how it changes across
treatment conditions.
Note that, for any value of L in the range [0, 1], the unique Nash equilibrium for
self-interested payoff-maximizing agents is to appropriate at capacity. This follows
from the observation that, given a maximum group capacity to appropriate of 100,
the MNB
j
i is positive for any value of L in the range [0, 1].
7 Earnings in Part B, C and D were denoted in Euros. The exchange rate at the time was US$1.36 per
Euro. On average subjects total earnings were 8.5 Euros (US$11.47) during the experiment which lasted
approximately 60 min. The results for the risk aversion task are not reported for brevity, as it was not
found to be significantly correlated with game decisions, potentially due to the small variability in the
choices made.
8 Except in the benchmark game, where L = 0 and MNB
j
i equals 0.5, independent of expected group
appropriation.
E. Blanco et al.
123
Hypothesis 1 Self-interested payoff-maximizing agents appropriate at zi ¼ 25
tokens in all treatment conditions.
However, a broad range of previous research on social dilemma settings has
shown that subjects make decisions that reflect complex and diverse motivations
beyond simple self-income maximization (see research summarized in Camerer
2003; Camerer and Fehr 2006; Ostrom and Walker 2003). Some but not all of these
motivations support models where subjects respond systematically to the private
benefits of their actions (internal returns) and the magnitude of externalities imposed
on others (external return) (see for example Goeree et al. 2002). The literature also
provides support for models where decision makers follow other regarding
preferences that are not sensitive to changes in magnitudes of externalities imposed
on others, such as the concept of ‘‘warm glow’’ as introduced by Andreoni (1990),
and examined in Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) among others.
If subjects were to respond solely to marginal net benefits, how would we expect
behavior to change with respect to the benchmark game in the treatment conditions?
Referring back to Fig. 1, first note that as compared to the constant MNBL0i ¼ 0:5 in
Table 1 Decision settings: parameters and marginal net benefits
Decision setting L p Marginal net benefit functions
L0 (benchmark game) 0 0.01 MNBL0i ¼ 0:5
L10 0.1 0.01 MNBL10i ¼ 0:45 þ 0:001  Z
L50 0.5 0.01 MNBL50i ¼ 0:25 þ 0:005  Z
L90 0.9 0.01 MNBL90i ¼ 0:05 þ 0:009  Z






















Fig. 1 Marginal net benefits as a function of aggregate group appropriation
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the L0 game, the expected marginal net benefit increases (decreases) for
expectations of group appropriation above (below) a critical threshold of 50 tokens
in all treatment conditions. Further, note that the range of values of MNB
j
i as a
function of group appropriation (vertical axis) increases with the size of L. In
particular, MNBL0i ¼ 0:5, MNBL10i 2 0:45; 0:55½ , MNBL50i 2 0:25; 0:75½ ,
MNBL90i 2 0:05; 0:95½ . Thus, across treatment conditions, the influence of first
order beliefs of group appropriation on the expected magnitude of MNB
j
i increases
with increases in L.
Hypothesis 2 Subjects responding to marginal net benefits increase (decrease)
appropriation in the probabilistic settings as compared to the benchmark setting if
expected total group appropriation is above (below) a threshold of 50 tokens.
Hypothesis 3 Subject responses to changes in treatment conditions are more
pronounced for larger loss parameters L.
Of course, as noted above, some subjects may also respond to incentives beyond
their own pecuniary return. As discussed, appropriation by subject i creates a
deterministic and probabilistic negative externality on other group members. More
specifically, the marginal harm to each other group member -i from appropriation
by subject i, MH
j






¼ n 1ð Þg
n
þ n 1ð Þg
n
Ljp  w 2Zð Þ ð3Þ
As shown, MH
j
i is inversely related to MNB
j
i , increasing in L, and decreasing in
Z. Similarly, as discussed for MNB
j
i , the directional response to treatment conditions
resulting from MH
j
i is affected by the critical threshold of first order beliefs of
group appropriation of 50 tokens. In sum, while higher values of Z increase the
magnitude of pecuniary benefits MNB
j
i , higher values of Z decrease the magnitude






Pooling across individuals, Table 2 provides mean individual appropriation and first
order beliefs of appropriation of others. On average, aggregate appropriation and
forecasts of others’ appropriation decrease as L increases and differences in all
paired comparisons are statistically significant (see Table A1 in the Electronic
Supplementary Material).
9 Disentangling how subjects respond to the tension between private marginal benefits and harm to other
group members is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, we focus on addressing the scope and
heterogeneity in responses to changes in the magnitude of changes in L.
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Focusing on heterogeneity in decisions across individuals and across treatments,
Fig. 2 provides an illustration of individual appropriation decisions and forecasts in
each treatment condition. As expected, in L0 (where only deterministic degradation
exists, and marginal net benefits and harm from appropriation are constant) there is
a substantial diversity in subjects’ appropriation decisions, providing evidence of
heterogeneity in underlying predispositions toward cooperativeness that are not
associated with changes in marginal incentives within the game. The symbols in
Fig. 2 are provided to reference the appropriation level of subjects in the L0 game: a
cross refers to low appropriation between 0 and 5 tokens, a triangle refers to high
appropriation between 20 and 25 tokens, and a circle subjects refers to intermediate
appropriation between 6-19 tokens. Examining the distribution of observations
across treatments, one observes many subjects who make appropriation decisions
Table 2 Average appropriation
and forecasts of others’
appropriation
L0 L10 L50 L90
Appropriation
Average 13.027 11.793 8.883 8.378
Standard deviation 10.176 9.797 9.534 10.84
Forecasts
Average 11.836 11.247 9.201 8.173
Standard deviation 7.429 6.997 7.201 8.994










































































0 5 10 15 20 25
Forecast in L90
d
Fig. 2 Individual appropriation decisions and forecasts of others’ appropriation
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that are quite consistent across games. In addition, there are some subjects who
make substantial changes in their appropriation decisions. For example, the triangles
in panels c and d near the horizontal axis represent subjects with low levels of
appropriation in L50 and L90. These are individuals, however, who appropriated at
or near the non-cooperative equilibrium in L0. A similar (but opposite) pattern is
observed by examining the subjects who had low levels of appropriation in the L0
game (crosses in panel a), who then made relatively large appropriation decisions in
the L50 and L90 treatments (crosses on the top range of panels c and d). In addition,
we examined to what extent individuals’ expectations of others’ appropriation
changed as L increased. Interestingly, 61.26% of subjects consistently decreased
their expectations, 26.13% consistently increased their expectations, and only
12.61% did not show a consistent change in expectations as L increased.
4.2 Individual responses to treatment conditions
The within-subject structure of the data is used by focusing on changes in
individuals’ decisions across treatments relative to their decisions in the L0 game.
This allows for testing for treatment effects controlling for the baseline appropri-
ation (subjects’ cooperativeness) where marginal incentives are independent of
group appropriation.
Table 3 presents OLS regression results for differences in appropriation between
decisions in a given treatment condition and L0 where the independent variable for
each regression is the expected marginal net benefit in each treatment condition
E(MNB
j
i ), j = L10, L50, L90. This variable is constructed following the functions in
Table 1, where expected group appropriation E(Z) by subject i in game j is the sum
of the forecast of i of the three other group members plus his/her own appropriation.
As shown, for all three paired comparisons, E(MNB
j
i ) is highly significant.
10
This analysis, however, does not lend itself to a straightforward comparison
across treatments on the relevancy of E(MNB
j
i ) or EðMH jiÞ. The reason for this




i across treatments. This is
illustrated for MNB
j
i in Fig. 3, which displays scatter plots of individual
Table 3 Individual
appropriation relative to L0 as a
function of expected marginal
net benefits
p values in parentheses
(1) (2) (3)
L10–L0 L50–L0 L90–L0
E(MNBL10i ) 80.82 (0.000) – –
E(MNBL50i ) – 29.98 (0.000) –
E(MNBL90i ) – – 23.42 (0.000)
Constant -41.28 (0.000) -17.11 (0.000) -12.75 (0.000)
N 111 111 111
R2 0.114 0.194 0.387
10 Using EðMH jiÞ as the explanatory variable does not alter the results. See Table A2 in the Electronic
Supplementary Material.
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appropriation decisions, expected marginal net benefits, and regression lines with
95% confidence intervals of the estimated OLS models. In particular, note the
differences in the range of MNB
j
i displayed on the horizontal axis for the different
treatment conditions.
As a resolution to the comparability issue described above, Table 4 presents the
results from an alternative OLS analysis where the explanatory variable is the
expected total group appropriation, E(Z).11 As shown, the coefficient for E(Z) is
positive and highly significant in all treatment conditions. Further, comparisons
across treatments show that both the constant term and the coefficient of
E(Z) significantly increase in absolute magnitude as L increases.12 Thus, in addition
to the result that own appropriation increases with forecasts of group appropriation,
treatment effects show that the magnitude of that response is stronger with increases
in the probabilistic loss parameter L. This result is consistent with the discussion in
Sect. 3 on responses to changes in the magnitude of the loss parameter based on
subjects responding to changes in expected marginal net benefits or to changes in
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Fig. 3 Illustration of results from Table 3
11 Using forecast of others leads to virtually the same result exept for the absolute magnitude of the
coefficients of the independent variable. These additional results are reported in Table A3 in the
Electronic Supplementary Material.
12 p values for corresponding Wald tests on changes in the constant term: L10 versus L50 (0.008), L50
versus L90 (0.000), L10 versus L90 (0.000). p values for corresponding Wald tests on changes in the
coefficient: L10 versus L50 (0.000), L50 versus L90 (0.003), L10 versus L90 (0.000).
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A natural extension of the analysis in Table 4 is to examine whether the
responses to changes in expectations of group appropriation are symmetric for
subjects whose forecasts of group appropriation are above and below the threshold
of 50 tokens referenced in Fig. 1, where expected marginal incentives in L10, L50,
and L90 equal that of L0. We use this objective reference point to define what we
refer to as pessimistic and optimistic subjects regarding group cooperation. Given
the appropriation frame used in this study, pessimistic subjects are those expecting
high appropriation levels (above 50) and optimistic subjects are those expecting low
appropriation levels (below or equal to 50). Table 5 presents OLS results that
parallel the approach presented in Table 4, except that the analysis is conducted
separately for subjects with expected group appropriation in a given treatment above
50 tokens (columns 1-3) and for those with expectations below or equal to 50 tokens
(columns 4-6). For this analysis, the variable E Zð Þ is transformed to E Z  50ð Þ.
Thus, the variable E Z  50ð Þ takes on values from 1 to 50 for the group of subjects
with expectations of total group appropriation above the threshold, and -50 to 0 for
those with expectations below the threshold. It follows that the estimated constant
term (in all columns) provides information on the appropriation levels relative to the
threshold of 50 tokens. Given that marginal net benefits to appropriate are identical
at the threshold, we would expect none of the intercept terms to be significantly




appropriation relative to L0 as a
function of expected group
appropriation
p values in parentheses
(1) (2) (3)
L10–L0 L50–L0 L90–L0
E(Z) 0.081 (0.001) 0.150 (0.000) 0.211 (0.000)
Constant -4.914 (0.000) -9.613 (0.000) -11.58 (0.000)
N 111 111 111
R2 0.114 0.194 0.387
Table 5 Individual appropriation relative to L0 as a function of expected group appropriation: pes-
simistic and optimistic subjects
‘‘Pessimistic’’ expectations above 50 ‘‘Optimistic’’ expectations below 50a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

























N 44 31 34 67 80 77
R2 0.091 0.133 0.128 0.010 0.016 0.028
a Includes subject with expectations exactly at 50 tokens
p values in parentheses
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Pessimistic subjects systematically respond to changes in first order beliefs
(significant coefficient for E Z  50ð Þ) while optimistic subjects do not. Moreover,
the constant terms for the optimistic subjects are negative and statistically
significant. The significantly negative intercept terms shown in columns 4 and 5
for optimistic subjects indicates that, despite marginal incentives being equal at the
threshold there is a significant downward shift in appropriation for subjects in the
L10 and L50 treatments as compared to the benchmark L0 condition.
To gain further insight into this result, we examine whether pessimistic and
optimistic subjects differ in their underlying cooperativeness in game L0 and in Part
D of the experiment, where they make donation decisions to charities.13 We find
that the subjects we classify as optimistic make appropriation decisions in L0 that
are more cooperative than those we classify as pessimistic. These differences are
statistically significant for treatments L10 and L50, but not so for L90. Similarly, we
find that optimistic subjects donate more to the charities than pessimistic subjects. In
these comparisons, however, the mean differences are statistically significant only
for L50 (see Tables A4 and A5 in the Electronic Supplementary Material).
5 Discussion of results and conclusions
This study examines how subjects respond to changes in the vulnerability of a
shared resource to appropriation pressures. Experimentally we vary the magnitude
of a probabilistic loss of a group fund, where the probability of occurrence of the
loss increases in appropriation. Thus, this study adds to the experimental literature
that examines subjects’ responses to endogenous probabilistic losses in social
dilemmas (Walker and Gardner 1992; Dickinson 1998; Gangadharan and Nemes
2009; Blanco et al. 2016b). We contribute to this literature by providing the first
results on the quantitative response to variations in the magnitude of endogenous
losses rather than just to the existence of the endogenous component.
We find that average group cooperation increases as the loss parameter
(L) increases; with important heterogeneities in individual behavior. Controlling
for individual decisions in the benchmark game without probabilistic losses, we
observe a behavioral difference between those subjects who forecast lower levels of
group cooperation versus those who forecast higher levels of group cooperation. In
particular, subjects who are pessimistic regarding others’ appropriation appropriate
at higher levels on average (84% of their appropriation capacity), and respond
systematically and significantly to changes in their expectations of others’
appropriation. Subjects who are optimistic about other’s appropriation appropriate
at lower levels on average (16% of their appropriation capacity). However, the latter
13 By construction, the composition of subjects in the optimistic groups can vary across games. However,
the overall number of subjects in the optimistic group holds relatively steady, with an average of 75
subjects. Further, there is fairly strong evidence that the composition of the optimistic groups do not
change dramatically across games in the sense that 64 subjects forecast total group appropriation of 50 or
below in 3 out of 4, or 4 out of 4 games. There was also no evidence of a gender bias in the composition.
The percentage of females in the optimistic groups holds relatively stable at a level that is almost identical
to the percentage of females in the subject pool.
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group does not make appropriation decisions that are as systematically linked to
changes in expectations of group appropriation.
More generally, these novel results add to the emergent literature that explores
individual differences in the responses to marginal incentives and reciprocity. In
particular, we show the relevance of threshold expectations on group cooperation in
defining subjects’ responsiveness (or lack of it) to others’ behavior. These findings
extend the results reported in Goeree et al. (2002), for provision decisions in a
public good setting with deterministic marginal benefits. In that study, the authors
observe, on average, a positive relationship between public good contributions and
the internal return to the contributor, as well as the return to other group members.
However, the effect of the internal return is larger and more systematic, as their
model estimates of individual’s altruism toward others suggests considerable
heterogeneity in responses.
What are possible explanations for the behavioral differences we observe
between optimistic and pessimistic subjects in this study? Suppose subjects’
behavior focuses primarily on individual expected marginal incentives. In the
context of our decision setting, pessimistic expectations of higher group appropri-
ation imply subjects perceive, relative to the benchmark condition, a higher
expected marginal private return from appropriation and a lower expected marginal
harm to the group. In this sense, if our subjects’ individual response to incentives is
consistent with that observed in Goeree et al. (2002), across the group of pessimistic
subjects, the increase in appropriation relative to their baseline appropriation can be
expected to make appropriation decisions that correlate more systematically with
their expectations of others’ appropriation. And, this is in fact what we observe for
the pessimistic subjects.
However, optimistic expectations of lower group appropriation imply subjects
perceive, relative to the benchmark condition, a lower expected marginal private
return from appropriation and a higher expected marginal harm to the group. In line
with the results from Goeree et al. (2002), we find that the optimistic subjects lower
appropriation overall. However, in terms of statistical significance, they do not
respond as systematically to changes in expected marginal incentives. One could
alternatively suppose that optimistic subjects’ decisions are influenced more
strongly by additional motives such as warm-glow from the act of cooperating or
fairness heuristics. These additional motivations could lead to decisions by
optimistic subjects that are less sensitive to changes in pecuniary incentives
inferred from changes in expectations of others’ behavior. In the context of our
experiment, such motivations would be compatible with the evidence that the
optimistic group made more cooperative decisions in the benchmark game, which is
what we observe.
In summary, in very different decision settings, one where marginal incentives
are deterministic and one where they are endogenous and dependent on expectations
of others’ behavior, both Goeree et al. (2002) and this study find evidence that
decisions are consistent with a more systematic response to changes in private
marginal incentives relative to the impact on other group members. In our study,
this heterogeneity in behavior is linked to threshold expectations of whether subjects
are more (or less) pessimistic about the actions of other group members.
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The policy implications of these results can be illustrated by the motivating
example of the maintenance of ecosystem services provided in the introduction. As
this study demonstrates, individuals may have heterogeneous responses to the
potential of increasingly severe endogenous destruction of a resource. While some
individuals might be willing to make necessary sacrifices in resource use by limiting
their appropriation (despite pecuniary incentives), others might perceive conserva-
tion objectives to be unrealistic (or unfeasible) and thus engage in highly extractive
strategies leading to a race-to-the-bottom. Which of these strategies individuals
undertake might be (at least partially) influenced by their first order beliefs of
others’ behavior.
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